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Apple Inc. v. Pepper: The Future of Software-Based
Retail—Incalculable Damages and Duplicitous
Liability

CHRISTOPHER DERIAN * ©
Apple Inc. uses the iOS App Store as a retail space for smartphone application
developers to sell their iPhone applications.1 The application developers set their
price and pay Apple Inc. a thirty-percent commission for each application that is sold
on the platform. 2 In 2011, four iPhone users filed a putative antitrust class action
complaint against Apple Inc. (hereafter, “Apple”), alleging that they paid
uncompetitively high prices when purchasing iPhone Applications (hereafter,
“apps”).3 In Apple Inc. v. Pepper,4 the Supreme Court considered whether iPhone
users who purchased apps through Apple’s iOS App Store (hereafter “the App
Store”) are direct purchasers of Apple and are therefore proper plaintiffs to sue Apple
for allegedly monopolizing the iPhone app market.5
Since the late nineteenth century, Congress has restricted monopolistic behavior,
and the Supreme Court has contextualized the scope and limitations of those
legislative restrictions.6 The Sherman Antitrust Act prohibits monopolistic behavior,7
and the Clayton Antitrust Act provides an avenue for injured persons to sue to

© Christopher Derian, 2021.
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1. Julia Alexander, A Guide to Platform Fees, THE VERGE (Sep. 22, 2020, 8:05 AM EDT),
https://www.theverge.com/21445923/platform-fees-apps-games-business-marketplace-apple-google.
2. Id.
3. In re Apple iPhone Antitrust Litig., No. 11-CV-06714-YGR, 2013 WL 6253147, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Dec.
2, 2013), rev’d and remanded, 846 F.3d 313 (9th Cir. 2017), aff’d sub nom. Apple Inc. v. Pepper, 139 S. Ct. 1514
(2019).
4. Apple Inc. v. Pepper, 139 S. Ct. 1514, 1519 (2019).
5. Id. at 1519-20.
6. See Section II.A-C.
7. Chapter 647, 51 Congress. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), codified at 15 U.SC. §§ 1-7.
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recover injuries stemming from monopolistic behavior. 8 In 1976, the Supreme Court
in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois9 affirmed prior Court precedent that limited the scope
of a proper plaintiff in antitrust suits to direct purchasers from alleged monopolists.10
Pass-on theories of liability are not proper antitrust suits under Illinois Brick.11 The
majority in Apple Inc. v. Pepper12 determined that the iPhone users are direct
purchasers of Apple and may sue Apple for alleged antitrust violations. 13
This comment argues that the Court in Apple ultimately erred in its application of
Illinois Brick to the facts.14 Further, the Court misapplied established precedential
theories of proximate cause to antitrust standing.15 Consequently, the Court failed to
consider its design’s reaching effect on the future of online retail markets.16
I. The Case

In Apple Inc. v. Pepper,17 the Supreme Court addressed whether the Ninth Circuit
properly determined that iPhone users have standing to sue Apple under the Clayton
Antitrust Act.18 In Pepper v. Apple Inc. (In re Apple iPhone Antitrust Litigation),19
four iPhone owners sued Apple in the United States District Court for the Northern
District of California, alleging monopolistic practices.20 As observed by the Ninth
Circuit, the iPhone users alleged that Apple’s practice of charging independent
iPhone app developers a thirty-percent commission directly caused app developers
to charge uncompetitively high prices for their apps.21 Apple had moved to dismiss,
arguing that iPhone owners were not direct consumers of Apple vis-à-vis their
purchase of iPhone apps and thus lacked standing to sue Apple under the Clayton
Antitrust Act.22 Apple claimed that if its alleged monopolistic practices harm anyone,

8. Chapter 323, 63 Congress. 38 Stat. 730 (1914), enacted October 15, 1914, codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1227, 29 U.S.C. §§ 52-53.
9. 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
10. Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 745-46 (1977).
11. In a pass-on theory, alleged illegal overcharges are passed along the chain of distribution to a third-party,
who then sues for antitrust injury. See Ill. Brick, 431 U.S. at 726 (“In general a pass-on theory may not be used
defensively” or “offensively by an indirect purchaser.”).
12. 139 S. Ct. 1514 (2019).
13. Apple Inc., 139 S. Ct. at 1519.
14. See infra Section IV.A.
15. See infra Section IV.B.
16. See infra Section IV.C.
17. 139 S. Ct. 1514 (2019).
18. Id. at 1519.
19. No. 11-CV-06714-YGR, 2013 WL 6253147, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2013), rev’d and remanded, 846
F.3d 313 (9th Cir. 2017), aff’d sub nom. Apple Inc. v. Pepper, 139 S. Ct. 1514 (2019).
20. Id.
21. Pepper v. Apple Inc. (In re Apple iPhone Antitrust Litig.), 846 F.3d 313, 315 (9th Cir. 2017).
22. Id.
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they harm the app developers, not the iPhone users, thereby limiting the scope of
proper plaintiffs to only app developers, excluding app purchasers.23 The district
court agreed and granted Apple’s motion to dismiss.24
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision, concluding that iPhone
users are direct purchasers because the iPhone users purchase apps from Apple,
which then pays the app developers (less the contracted commission price).25 The
Ninth Circuit relied on Illinois Brick,26 where the Court held that a plaintiff must be
a direct purchaser from an alleged antitrust violator to sue for damages under section
four of the Clayton Act.27 The Ninth Circuit considered whether the iPhone users
purchased apps either directly from Apple, which operated the App Store, or the app
developers, who set the price for and sell their apps in the App Store.28 The Ninth
Circuit identified Apple as a distributor of iPhone apps, selling them directly to
purchasers through its App Store.29 Accordingly, because Apple is a direct distributor
under this interpretation, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the Plaintiffs have standing
under Illinois Brick to sue Apple for allegedly monopolizing the sale of iPhone
apps.30
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the
consumers who brought suit were proper plaintiffs under the Clayton Antitrust Act. 31
In its decision, the Court focused specifically on whether they purchased iPhone apps
directly from Apple. 32
II. Legal Background

In response to the pervasive anticompetitive practices of major industrial
corporations, Congress passed the Sherman Act33 in 1890 as a “comprehensive
charter of economic liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as
the rule of trade.”34 In 1914, Congress passed two additional antitrust laws: the

23. See In re Apple iPhone Antitrust Litig., 846 F.3d at 323 (summarizing Apple’s contention that it does
not sell apps, but rather sells software distribution services to App developers, analogizing its position to a
“shopping mall owner” that “leases physical spaces to various store”).
24. No. 11-CV-06714-YGR, 2013 WL 6253147, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2013).
25. In re Apple iPhone Antitrust Litig., 846 F.3d at 320.
26. 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
27. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (allowing the recovery of damages by “any person injured in his business or property by
reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws”).
28. In re Apple iPhone Antitrust Litig., 846 F.3d at 315.
29. Id. at 322.
30. Id.
31. 139 S. Ct. at 1514.
32. Apple Inc. v. Pepper, 138 S. Ct. 2647 (2018).
33. Chapter 647, 51 Congress. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7.
34. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
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Federal Trade Commission Act35 and the Clayton Act.36 The addition of the Clayton
Act to the United States antitrust law provides inter alia a pathway for persons
injured by competitive practices to recover damages.37 Over the subsequent decades,
the Supreme Court has interpreted the Clayton Act’s implications on varying classes
of potential litigants seeking recovery for damages stemming from alleged
anticompetitive behavior.38 Section II.A describes the initial passing and scope of the
Sherman Act.39 Next, Section II.B describes the passing and scope of the Clayton
Antitrust Act.40 Finally, Section II.C examines key treatment of the antitrust laws by
the Supreme Court regarding standing and damages.41
A. The Sherman Antitrust Act
Congress passed the Sherman Antitrust Act42 in 1890, codifying restrictions on
anticompetitive and anti-interstate commercial activities in the marketplace.43 The
Sherman Antitrust Act makes unlawful any practice determined to “monopolize, or
attempt to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States,
or with foreign nations.”44 Section One of the Act states that “[e]very contract,
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be
illegal.”45 Section Two of the Act makes a felony of the monopolization of interstate
commercial activity.46 For many activities, the Sherman Act prohibits only
objectively unreasonable behavior.47 The Act does, however, enumerate per se
violations, including “plain arrangements among competing individuals” and
“businesses to fix prices, divide markets, or rig bids.”48 The Sherman Antitrust Act’s
passing was unprecedented legislation that provided civil (and limited criminal)

35. The Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2021).
36. 38 Stat. 730, enacted October 15, 1914, codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27, 29 U.S.C. §§ 52–53.
37. 15 U.S.C. § 15.
38. See infra Section II.C.
39. See infra Section II.A.
40. See infra Section II.B.
41. See infra Section II.C.
42. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7.
43. See generally id.
44. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2021).
45. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2021).
46. 15 U.S.C. § 2.
47. 15 U.S.C. § 6a.
48. The Antitrust Laws, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competitionguidance/guide-antitrust-laws/antitrust-laws (last visited Mar. 26, 2021).
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enforcement against certain free-market enterprises deemed harmful to specific
consumers.49
B. The Clayton Act
In 1914, Congress supplemented previous antitrust legislation with the passing of
the Clayton Antitrust Act.50 The Clayton Act’s passing addressed monopolistic
activities not regulated in the Sherman Antitrust Act, such as mergers and
interlocking directorates.51 The Act outlines “treble damages” for injuries caused by
activities in violation of the statute, meaning actual damages that are equivalent to
three times the amount of injury that the injured party has suffered. 52 The Act
clarified the type of injury for which people may sue for an antitrust violation as
“[t]he diminishment of a person’s property by a payment of money wrongfully
induced.”53 Generally, when a court determines damages are due and owed for an
injury stemming from anticompetitive activity, courts will triple the difference
between the price paid and the market price.54
C. Key Treatment of Antitrust Law by the Supreme Court
In Southern Pacific Co. v. Darnell-Taenzer Lumber Co.,55 the Supreme Court
addressed whether plaintiffs “passing on damages” sustained by paying
uncompetitive prices by collecting that amount from their customers prevented their
recovering damages.56 The Court applied the longstanding jurisprudential theory of
proximate cause to suits where parties are injured by antitrust violations, noting the
“general tendency of the law, in regard to damages at least, is not to go beyond the
first step.”57 Southern Pacific set off a wave of Supreme Court cases establishing an
apparent super-precedent restricting antitrust cases to only those where damages are
not passed-on to Plaintiffs.58
In Hanover Shoe v. United Machinery Corp.,59 the Supreme Court reaffirmed and
defined the rule of proximate cause as applied to those injured by antitrust
49. Id.
50. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27.
51. The Antitrust Laws, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competitionguidance/guide-antitrust-laws/antitrust-laws (last visited Mar. 26, 2021) (explaining that interlocking directorates
means the same person making business decisions for competing companies).
52. 15 U.S.C § 15.
53. Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390, 396 (1906).
54. See id. at 396.
55. 245 U.S. 531 (1918).
56. S. Pac. Co. v. Darnell-Taenzer Lumber Co., 245 U.S. 531 (1918).
57. Id.
58. See infra notes 59-70 and accompanying text.
59. 392 U.S. 481 (1968).
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violations.60 In Hanover Shoe, the Plaintiff, a manufacturer of shoes, brought a treble
damage antitrust action alleging injury from the Defendant’s monopolistic shoe
machinery market.61 The Court agreed with the Defendant’s assertion that the
Plaintiff, having “passed-on” the alleged illegal overcharge as reflected in its own
conflated shoe prices, suffered no cognizable injury. 62 The Court’s ruling went on to
prohibit antitrust violators from using a “pass-on theory” defensively.63 The Court
reasoned that permitting pass-on theories in calculating damages would “involv[e]
massive evidence and complicated theories,” unduly and unnecessarily burdening
the judicial system.64
Ten years later, in Illinois Brick,65 the Supreme Court applied a similar rule to
antitrust plaintiffs, declining to “permit offensive use of a pass-on theory against an
alleged violator.”66 The Court described the similar complication that would arise in
calculating damages as recognized previously in Hanover Shoe.67 Further, allowing
pass-on theories would allow “plaintiffs at each level in the distribution chain” to
“assert conflicting claims to a common fund,” which would require “massive efforts
to apportion the recovery among all potential plaintiffs that could have absorbed part
of the overcharge—from direct purchasers to middlemen, to ultimate consumers.”68
Permitting pass-on theories in this way requires courts to determine the amount of
monopolized charges that were absorbed by intermediary purchasers and how much
those purchasers were able to pass on to customers down the distribution chain ad
infinitum.69 To mitigate these potential complications, the Court established the
bright-line rule of antitrust standing, where only direct purchasers from an alleged
antitrust violator may sue under Section Four of the Clayton Act.70

60. Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 490 (1968).
61. Id. at 483.
62. See id. at 487-89 (holding that only where a buyer claiming injury under antitrust law, “in the face of
the overcharge . . . does nothing ad absorbs the loss, he [is] entitled to treble damages”).
63. Id. at 513.
64. Id. at 493.
65. Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
66. Id. at 735 (emphasis added).
67. See id. at 725 (rejecting indirect purchasers as proper plaintiffs due to “an unwillingness to complicate
treble-damage actions with attempts to trace the effects of the overcharge on the purchaser’s prices, sales, costs,
and profits, and of showing that these variables would behave differently without the overcharge”).
68. Id. at 737.
69. Id. at 757.
70. Id. at 726.
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III. The Court’s Reasoning

Writing for the majority in Apple Inc. v. Pepper,71 Justice Kavanaugh upheld the
Ninth Circuit’s ruling, holding that the iPhone owners are direct consumers of Apple
and therefore have standing to bring an antitrust suit. 72 Relying on the language in
the antitrust legislation and Supreme Court precedent, the Court reasoned that the
iPhone users purchased the apps directly from Apple.73 Accordingly, under Illinois
Brick,74 the iPhone users were direct consumers who may sue Apple for alleged
monopolization.75 Ultimately, Justice Kavanaugh relied on the specific and direct
contractual relationship between the two parties, reading Illinois Brick to permit a
plaintiff that maintains a direct purchaser relationship with a retailer to sue that
retailer for antitrust damages.76
The majority opinion first relied on the relevant statutory text: 77 Section 2 of the
Sherman Antitrust Act, which prohibits monopolization, 78 and Section 4 of the
Clayton Antitrust Act, which provides judicial remedy for persons injured by an
antitrust violator.79 Applying Section 4 of the Clayton Act to the Court’s decision in
Illinois Brick, immediate buyers from alleged antitrust violators may sue, and
indirect buyers may not sue.80 Justice Kavanaugh reasoned that where no
intermediary stands in the distribution chain between Apple and the app purchaser,
who pays Apple directly, the purchasers are direct consumers under Illinois Brick.81
The dispositive question for the majority was whether or not a direct contract exists
between the parties.82 According to the majority, such a contract exists in this case.83

71. 139 S. Ct. 1514 (2019).
72. Apple Inc., 139 S. Ct. at 1525.
73. Id. at 1520.
74. 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
75. Apple Inc., 139 S. Ct. at 1520.
76. Id. at 1525 (2019) (recasting Illinois Brick as a rule forbidding only suits where the Plaintiff lacks
contractual privity with the defendant, regardless of who sets the price).
77. Id. at 1520.
78. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2004) makes it unlawful for any person to “monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or
combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among
the several States, or with foreign nations.”
79. 15 U.S.C § 15(a) (2017) states that “any person who shall be injured in his business or property by
reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue . . . the defendant . . . and shall recover threefold the
damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney’s fee.”
80. Apple Inc., 139 S. Ct. at 1521.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1523.
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The Court then outlined three problems with Apple’s argument that Illinois Brick
only allows consumers to sue the party who sets the retail price. 84 First, the “who sets
the price” theory contradicts legislative intent.85 According to Justice Kavanaugh,
the Sherman Act was intended to be read broadly to accomplish the goal of
countering antitrust violations, and the Court should therefore apply that goal broadly
in its interpretation of Illinois Brick.86 The legal technicalities Apple raises, he
argued, should not interfere with this goal.87 Second, Apple’s theory draws arbitrary
lines among retailers and manufacturers based on particular financial arrangements
on price setting.88 Third, the implications of adopting Apple’s theory directs
corporations to structure their contracts in such a way to make sure they are not
setting the prices and thereby avoiding the reach of antitrust law on a technicality.89
The four-Justice dissent, written by Justice Gorsuch, considered the majority
opinion to misapply Illinois Brick’s90 rejection of pass-on theories of liability. 91
Given that the plaintiffs purchased the apps from third-party app developers, the
developers are the parties directly injured by any alleged monopolization.92 The
iPhone users are only harmed if the app developers choose to pass-on the overcharge
to the app purchasers.93 The dissent additionally considers the majority rule as
overcomplicating the calculation of damages,94 a problem specifically addressed in
the reasoning in Illinois Brick.95 Suppose it is said, as the majority does, that the
dispositive question is whether or not a direct contract exists. In that case, Apple can
structure its relationship with iPhone users so the app purchasers are outside of direct
contract with Apple.96 Apple could easily develop a system wherein app purchasers
pay money directly to the developer, who then pays Apple its thirty-percent

84. See id. (stating that Apple’s “who sets the price theory” relies on an interpretation of Illinois Brick as
allowing consumers to sue only the party who sets the retail price, whether or not that party sells the goods or
services directly to the complaining party, rather than the party who merely provides a retail space and charges a
commission for the sellers).
85. Id.
86. Apple Inc., 139 S. Ct. at 1521.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Apple Inc., 139 S. Ct. at 1525 (Gorsuch, J., Dissenting).
91. Id. at 1528.
92. Id. at 1529.
93. Id. at 1525.
94. Id. at 1529.
95. Id.
96. Apple Inc., 139 S. Ct. at 1530 (Gorsuch, J., Dissenting).
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commission.97 Ultimately, the dissent implies that the majority opinion injudiciously
rejects cogent and established jurisprudential theories of proximate cause.98
IV. Analysis

In Apple Inc. v. Pepper,99 the Supreme Court held that consumers who purchase
goods or services at higher-than-competitive prices in an allegedly monopolistic
retailer’s store may sue the retailer under antitrust law.100 Specifically, the Court held
that the plaintiff iPhone owners, who purchased apps through Apple’s App Store, are
direct purchasers under Illinois Brick and may thus sue Apple.101 The Court’s
judgment was incorrectly decided because the holding misapplied the precedential
reasoning of Illinois Brick, which sought to prohibit the very type of suit presented
in this case.102 In addition to misapplying precedent, the Court engaged in circular
reasoning in its effort to assert an overly broad statutory interpretation, effectuating
incalculable damages for this case and future like-cases.103 Finally, the Court’s
decision ignores the direction of technological process of software-based retail
spaces and creates overly complicated, repetitive, and ineffectual procedures for an
injured party to obtain damages.104
A. The Court’s Holding is Incorrect Because it Misapplied Precedent Established
in Illinois Brick
The majority opinion in Apple Inc. v. Pepper105 interpreted its 1977 ruling in
Illinois Brick to prohibit suits only where a plaintiff does not contract directly with
the defendant.106 Because the iPhone users in this case did have contractual privity
with Apple through the App Store, the majority held that Illinois Brick makes the
iPhone users proper plaintiffs to sue Apple for antitrust violations. The critical
holding in Illinois Brick was the Court’s rejection of “pass-on” theories of
damages—the notion that an antitrust plaintiff cannot sue a defendant for

97. Id.
98. Apple Inc., 139 S. Ct. at 1526 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (noting that “under ancient rules of proximate
causation, the ‘general tendency of the law, in regard to damages at least, is not to go beyond the first
step’” (quoting Hanover Shoe, 392 U. S. at 490), and concluding that app purchasers are separated from Apple
by the app developers).
99. 139 S. Ct. 1514 (2019).
100. Id. at 1525.
101. Id.
102. See infra Section IV.A.
103. See infra Section IV.B.
104. See infra Section IV.C.
105. 139 S. Ct. 1514 (2019).
106. Apple Inc., 139 S. Ct. at 1526 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
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overcharging someone else who might have passed on some amount of overcharge
to them.
The case at hand is precisely the type of “pass-on” damages case that Illinois Brick
prohibits.107 The Plaintiffs in this case purchased apps from third-party app
developers in Apple’s retail store.108 The app prices are set by the app developers,
who then pay Apple a thirty-percent commission for every app sold.109 The first tier
of damages from alleged monopolistic behavior is, therefore, suffered by the app
developers, who may choose, or not choose, to pass on the monopolistic overcharge
to the iPhone users.110 According to Illinois Brick, only purchasers connected by a
single link in the distribution chain may sue.111 The Court’s ruling rested on the
undue burden and overcomplication caused by permitting parties not directly
connected on the chain of distribution to sue non-proximate distributors. Permitting
consumers to sue retailers for damages passed-on to consumers requires
“determining how much of the manufacturer’s monopoly rent was absorbed by an
intermediary… and how much they were able and chose to pass on to their
customers.”112 Further, calculating passed-on damages requires “complicated
theories” about “how the relevant market variables would have behaved had there
been no overcharge.”113 Such a calculation is not only incredibly complex, requiring
massive evidence and calculation, but in many cases, nearly impossible.114
Apple requires the price of all apps in the App Store to end in ninety-nine cents,
and the vast majority of apps in the App Store are only ninety-nine cents.115 As the
dissent notes, a developer charging ninety-nine cents cannot raise its price in line
with the thirty-cent commission it owes to Apple..116 So to recover any purported
losses, App developers would have to increase their apps’ price by over one-hundred

107. Ill. Brick, 431 U.S. at 750 (holding that a consumer separated from a manufacturer in a distribution chain
by a third-party may not engage in an antitrust suit where the third-party passes on higher-than-competitive prices
to the consumer); Apple Inc., 139 S. Ct. at 1526 (holding that iPhone app purchasers may sue Apple, despite
being separated in the chain of distribution by app developers, who allegedly pass on higher-than-competitive
prices to consumers).
108. See supra notes 124-125 and accompanying text.
109. Julia Alexander, A Guide to Platform Fees, THE VERGE (Sep. 22, 2020, 8:05 AM EDT),
https://www.theverge.com/21445923/platform-fees-apps-games-business-marketplace-apple-google.
110. Apple Inc., 139 S. Ct. at 1522.
111. Id.
112. Ill. Brick Co., 431 U.S. at 735.
113. Id. at 741-43.
114. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
115. Apple Inc., 139 S. Ct. at 1528 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
116. Id.
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percent to recover the thirty percent owed to Apple. 117 This illustration serves to
demonstrate the complexities of calculating passed-on damages, being the very
reason the Court in Illinois Brick forbade them.118 The majority opinion claims that
there is no intermediary between Apple and the iPhone users and that the absence of
an intermediary is dispositive119—a misapprehension of the actual chain of
distribution.120 Apple and the app purchasers are separated in the distribution chain
by the app developers who set their own prices.121 The majority goes on, claiming to
not “understand the relevance of the upstream market structure in deciding whether
a downstream consumer may sue a monopolistic retailer.”122 The relevance the
majority seeks stems directly from Illinois Brick’s clear stance on such market
structures.123 If by nothing more than precedent, being “two or more” steps removed,
a downstream consumer cannot retain a proper antitrust suit against an upstream
retailer.124 In this case, the app purchasers are two steps removed from Apple. The
intermediary is the app developers who may either absorb or pass-on any due or
undue expenses imposed by Apple.125
B. The Court Applied Circular Reasoning in its Statutory Interpretation of
Proximate Cause in Antitrust Law
Apple pushed a “price-setting theory”—one that interprets Illinois Brick as
allowing consumers to sue only the party that sets the retail price, regardless of
whether that party operates the retail space where the goods are sold. 126 The majority
purports that Apple’s theory provides a “roadmap for monopolistic retailers to
structure transactions with manufacturers or suppliers so as to evade antitrust claims
by consumers. “127 The majority considers a system of standing based on price setting
as problematic because Apple, knowing this, is fully incentivized to alter its contracts

117. Id. (“[A] developer charging $0.99 for its app can’t raise its price by just enough to recover the 30-cent
commission. Instead, if the developer wants to pass on the commission to consumers, it has to more than double
its price to $1.99 (doubling the commission in the process), which could significantly affect its sales.”).
118. Ill. Brick Co., 431 U.S. at 732 (noting that “the attempt to trace the complex economic adjustments to a
change in the cost of a particular factor of production would greatly complicate and reduce the effectiveness of
already protracted treble-damages proceedings applies . . . [to] pass-on theories . . . .”).
119. Apple Inc., 139 S. Ct. at 1521.
120. See supra note 110 and accompanying text (explaining that the dispositive intermediary is the app
developers).
121. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
122. Apple Inc., 139 S. Ct. at 1523.
123. See generally Ill. Brick Co., 431 U.S. 720 (explicitly forbidding downstream consumers from suing an
alleged monopolistic retailer upstream the distribution chain).
124. Ill. Brick Co., 431 U.S. at 732.
125. Apple Inc., 139 S. Ct. at 1523.
126. Id.
127. Id.
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in such a way as to evade antitrust laws—namely, have the funds from an app
purchase go first to the developer, who then pays Apple its thirty percent
commission, rather than vice versa, as is the current system.128
While relevant, this concern does not actually support the conclusion of the
majority and, in fact, results in the exact outcome the Court rejects.129 For the
majority, Illinois Brick prioritizes contractual privity relationships between the
parties as a basis for antitrust standing.130 The decision here gives just as much
direction to retailers like Apple to structure their relationships in such a way as to
avoid antitrust laws.131 For example, Apple now is incentivized, and arguably
instructed, to structure its relationship with app purchasers so the direct contractual
privity is first between the app developers and the app purchasers, who then remit
the thirty percent back to Apple.132 This technical contractual shift effectively
removes retailers from antitrust liability. 133
The outcome in this case therefore fails to incentivize online console retailers to
alter any allegedly monopolistic behavior at all, but rather to merely alter their
contractual relationships.134 The majority’s concern is tautological in that both an
affirmation or reversal of the Court of Appeals ruling provides direction to alleged
monopolists to restructure their contractual privity to appear to comply with the
Court’s ruling while actually evading antitrust liability.135
Further, the hypothetical offered by the Court in contention with the “who sets the
price theory” has little basis in reality. 136 Consider the following hypothetical offered
by Justice Kavanaugh:137
In a traditional markup pricing model, a hypothetical monopolistic
retailer might pay $6 to the manufacturer and then sell the product for
$10, keeping $4 for itself. In a commission pricing model, the retailer
might pay nothing to the manufacturer; agree with the manufacturer that
the retailer will sell the product for $10 and keep 40 percent of the sales
price; and then sell the product for $10, send $6 back to the manufacturer,

128. Id. at 1523-24.
129. See infra notes 130-134 and accompanying text.
130. Apple Inc., 139 S. Ct. at 1521-23.
131. See infra note 133 and accompanying text.
132. See infra note 133 and accompanying text.
133. As the majority opinion in Apple Inc. rests antitrust standing on contractual privity, retailers like Apple
now know to structure their business relationships with app purchasers in such a way that mitigates contractual
privity.
134. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
135. See supra notes 129-132 and accompanying text.
136. See infra notes 139-42 and accompanying text.
137. Apple Inc., 139 S. Ct. at 1522.
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and keep $4. In those two different pricing scenarios, everything turns out
to be economically the same for the manufacturer, retailer, and
consumer.138
While it is true that the end result is the same, in each case the actual actor is in
fact different. 139 If the retailer setting the ten-dollar price is a monopolist, then they
are the party committing the legal violation. 140 In reality, a practice where a
manufacturer sets the price, while at the same time the retailer is acting with
monopolistic power, is practically non-existent.141 Consider a hypothetical where
there is a monopolistic retailer that has to take from the manufacturer the price that
it is going to sell at in the open market. This situation is so tenuously related to actual
business practice, that the hypothetical itself is at most purely academic.142 This
tenuous connection serves to strengthen the notion that the price setter is the party
who may or may not act monopolistically, because those situations are commonplace
in real business relationships.143 In this case, and in many antitrust cases, the plaintiffs
claim injury stemming from paying uncompetitively high prices.144 The nature of the
contract between the iPhone users and Apple is nowhere presented by the plaintiffs
as the basis for the alleged uncompetitively high prices.145 Therefore, the price-setter
is the most direct link to the plaintiffs’ damages, and antitrust standing ought to be
recognized only in a suit against the price-setter.146
Consider two popular online retailers: the Epic Game Store, which takes a twelvepercent commission on games sold, and Steam, which takes a thirty-percent cut on
the PC marketplace.147 Some developers have moved their games over to the Epic
Game Store and have sold at the same retail price that they sold on Steam, suggesting
that removing that commission will not affect the prices set by the developers. 148

138. Id.
139. See infra note 145 and accompanying text.
140. Id.
141. See supra Section II.C (providing key treatment of antitrust standing cases, in each case limiting standing
to the price setter).
142. Id.
143. See infra note 145 and accompanying text.
144. Id.
145. See generally Apple Inc. v. Pepper, 139 S. Ct. 1514, 1519 (2019) (noting that the plaintiffs claimed
injuries stem from allegedly paying uncompetitively high prices for Apps); Apple Inc., 139 S. Ct. at 1528
(Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (noting that developers set the price of their apps, not Apple).
146. Id.
147. JONATHAN B ORCK ET AL., APPLE’S APP STORE AND OTHER DIGITAL MARKETPLACES 6 (2020),
https://www.analysisgroup.com/globalassets/insights/publishing/apples_app_store_and_other_digital_marketpl
aces_a_comparison_of_commission_rates.pdf.
148. Kyle Orland, Should PC Games Cost Less On Epic’s Game Store?, ARSTECHNICA (Jan. 29, 2019, 3:49
PM), https://arstechnica.com/gaming/2019/01/should-pc-games-cost-less-on-epics-games-store/ (noting the first
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After all, developers understand the supply and demand curves for their products
better than retail store owners.149 By this example, the developers model their prices
individually, and do not model their prices based on the particular retail space they
are selling.150 Notably, Apple’s thirty-percent commission generally coincides with
the market value for other predominant online retailers.151
A system where a retailer sets the price for a manufacturer cuts against the notion
that the manufacturer is a monopolistic actor at all.152 A retailer’s monopolistic power
stems directly from its ability to set a price.153 A system that limits the scope of a
“direct purchaser” to one with contractual privity incentivizes manufacturers to
restructure their contracts to avoid antitrust laws. 154 Further, restricting the price
setter from antitrust liability ignores actual market practice, in particular, the
effective enforcement of antitrust laws.155
C. The Court’s Decision Obfuscates Antitrust Standing in the Growing Field of
Console Retail Stores
The impact of the Court’s decision in this case has far-reaching implication on the
expanding market of software-based console retailers,156 most notably with online
gaming stores.157 The effect of the Court’s decision limits the ability of a developer
of a piece of software to set the prices of its own software because of the risk of
antitrust accusations of direct contractual privity. Platforms like Apple’s App store
are growing exponentially in popularity. 158 Software-based online applications that
operate as retail stores for smartphone and computer apps like Steam and Epic Games

case of a reduced price following a commission reduction, suggesting the price for the majority of games sold on
Steam and Epic Games are relatively similar).
149. Id.
150. Id. (inferring how developers model prices from the disparate commission models between Steam and
Epic Games, while game prices are similar on both platforms).
151. BORCK, supra note 147.
152. See supra notes 142; 145.
153. Section 4 of the Clayton Act’s broad text stipulates recovery of damages by consumers who purchase
goods or services at higher-than-competitive prices. See infra note 8. It follows that the party who sets the price
has the power to set that price at a rate higher than free-market forces permit.
154. See supra note 133.
155. See supra notes 145-149.
156. Adi Robertson, How Apple’s Supreme Court Loss Could Change the Way You Buy Apps, THE VERGE,
(May 14, 2019, 4:04pm EDT), https://www.theverge.com/2019/5/14/18618127/apple-pepper-supreme-courtloss-kavanaugh-opinion-app-store-antitrust-explainer-vergecast.
157. Id.
158. The Global Gaming Industry Takes Centre Stage, MORGAN STANLEY (Aug. 26, 2020),
https://www.morganstanley.com.au/ideas/the-global-gaming-industry.
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are just two examples of the growing market, both of which charge commission to
software game developers to sell on their platforms.159
The Court’s ruling now incentives the large retailers, concerned that granting
price-setting freedom to developers exposes it to unnecessary liability, to restrict the
ability of a software developer to price control access to that software, effectively
reducing the market power of the developers.160 The effect of an exacerbated powerimbalance has the potential to decrease competitiveness in the software-based
gaming space, as power is taken from smaller, more vulnerable developers, and
accumulated by the owners of the retail space, like Apple.161 This is a counterintuitive
consequence of an apparent antitrust case.162 The Court’s ruling now exposes these
types of retailers to unintended liability—as multiple parties along the distribution
chain, the developers and the gamers, now have ostensible standing to sue if they
find that commission access unreasonable.163
V. Conclusion

In Apple Inc. v. Pepper,164 the Supreme Court held that under Illinois Brick,
iPhone users who purchased apps in the Apple App Store, with prices set by thirdparty developers, are direct purchasers of Apple and thus proper plaintiffs to bring
an antitrust suit against Apple.165 The Court erred in its interpretation of the precedent
established in Illinois Brick because Apple and iPhone users are separated in the
chain of distribution by app developers.166 In finding iPhone users and Apple to be
directly linked in the chain of distribution, the Court ignored theories of proximate
159. Michael Andonico, You Don’t Need a PS5 or Xbox Series X Right Now—Here’s Why, CNN, (Dec. 9,
2020, 3:12 PM EST), https://www.cnn.com/2020/12/09/cnn-underscored/alternatives-ps5-xbox-seriesx/index.html.
160. Adi Robertson, How Apple’s Supreme Court Loss Could Change the Way You Buy Apps, THE VERGE,
(May 14, 2019, 4:04pm EDT), https://www.theverge.com/2019/5/14/18618127/apple-pepper-supreme-courtloss-kavanaugh-opinion-app-store-antitrust-explainer-vergecast.
161. Apple retains hegemonic status in the power balance it maintains with app developers and is incentivized
to restrict app developers’ ability to price control, given that now all antitrust liability is concentrated with Apple.
See John Swartz, Apple vs. Epic: Why Cloud Gaming Became a Hot Topic at Landmark Antitrust Trial,
MARKETWATCH, (May 8, 2021, 10:54a.m. ET), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/apple-epic-trial-epicsclaim-of-stifled-competition-on-cloud-gaming-offers-compelling-bookend-to-price-gouging-charges11620327152.
162. See supra note 161 and accompanying text. In an attempt to expose a large tech corporation to antitrust
liability, the Court has incentivized a contractual relationship that limits the competitiveness of the alleged
antitrust victims.
163. Adi Robertson, How Apple’s Supreme Court Loss Could Change the Way You Buy Apps, THE VERGE,
(May 14, 2019, 4:04pm EDT), https://www.theverge.com/2019/5/14/18618127/apple-pepper-supreme-courtloss-kavanaugh-opinion-app-store-antitrust-explainer-vergecast.
164. Apple Inc. v. Pepper, 139 S. Ct. 1514 (2019).
165. Id. at 1520.
166. See supra Section IV.A.
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cause within congressionally ratified antitrust legislation.167 As the market for online
console applications grows, the Court’s decision creates long term complications and
injustices for software developers and retailers alike.168

167.
168.
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